Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 15
Issue 3 Spring
Spring 1995

Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones Board: Making
Foreign Trade Zone Decisions Reflect the
Legislative Intent of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of
1934
William G. Kanellis

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Trade Commons
Recommended Citation
William G. Kanellis, Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones Board: Making Foreign Trade Zone Decisions Reflect the Legislative Intent
of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, 15 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 606 (1994-1995)

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

COMMENTS

Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones
Board: Making Foreign Trade Zone
Decisions Reflect the Legislative
Intent of the Foreign Trade Zones
Act of 1934
William G. Kanellis

INTRODUCTION

Near Lake Calumet outside of Chicago, sugar from Guatemala
arrives by barge. It is unloaded and soon stored on the grounds of a
local candy manufacturer. This sugar is somewhat unique in that it is
treated quite differently than other imported products. Unlike other
products arriving from other countries, this sugar is not taxed as sugar.
In fact, it is not even counted as being within United States territory.
Instead, it is mixed with domestic ingredients such as dextrose and
powdered milk and "enters" United States territory as an entirely different product. Thus, in lieu of paying at the imported tariff rate for
sugar, the candy company pays at the lower rate for the candy product
that emerges, much to the delight of those concerned with company
profits.
The candy company can do this because it operates within a Foreign Trade Zone. The myriad of businesses using Foreign Trade
Zones runs across the commercial spectrum, with good reason. Foreign Trade Zones offer substantial competitive advantages to those
fortunate enough to operate inside them. In fact, these advantages
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are so apparent, even the lay observer would recognize that every
business which imports foreign components would want, and should
be afforded, zone benefits. Those who have closely examined the Foreign Trade Zone system in the United States offer the same criticism.
Many increasingly question the fairness and the usefulness of the Foreign Trade Zone.
The Foreign Trade Zone is an area inside United States territory
which, for customs purposes, is considered outside of United States
Customs territory. Various monetary and administrative benefits accrue to those who are allowed to operate within a foreign trade zone.
Foreign Trade Zones were created in 1934 by the Foreign Trade Zones
Act' to improve the domestic economy and stimulate foreign commerce. The Foreign Trade Zones Act also created the Foreign Trade
Zones Board.2 The Board is charged with the responsibility of setting
up regulations surrounding Foreign Trade Zone creation and use.
The relevance and prevalence of Foreign Trade Zones has grown
dramatically
in the last twenty years. The number has risen from 18 in
1973, 4 to 370 in 1990,5 to 478 in 1995. 6 The value of merchandise handled by the Foreign Trade Zones increased from $161 million in 19737
to over $90 billion in 1991. 8 Over half of the 310 designated customs
ports of entry in the United States have Foreign Trade Zones9 and
more than 2,200 businesses currently use them.10
The use and impact of the great number of Foreign Trade Zones
now in existence not only contravenes the legislative intent of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, but, according to some, is nothing but
an unfair competitive advantage for select corporations." Others suggest that the use of Foreign Trade Zones may hurt the domestic economy more than they help it- and that those who approve zones have
1 Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-397,48 Stat. 998, (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1988)).
2 19 U.S.C. § 81b(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
3 15 C.F.R. § 400 (1991).
4 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report to the Chairman, House Committee on Ways and

Means: Foreign Trade Zone Growth Primarily Benefits Users Who Import for Domestic Commerce, GAO REP. GGD-84-52, iii (Mar. 1984)(Hereinafter GAO REP.).
5 John J. Da Ponte, Jr., Updated Rules for Foreign-TradeZones Reflect Big Increase in Zone
Activity, Bus. Am., Nov. 4, 1991, at 9.
6 Telephone Interview with Camille Evans, Program Assistant, Foreign Trade Zones staff
(May 25, 1995).
7 GAo REP., supra note 4, at iii.

8
9
10
11

FTZ Staff, Foreign Trade Zones Information Summary, Apr. 20, 1992, at 2.
Id. at 10.
See GAo REP., supra note 4, at 20.
See infra text accompanying notes 116-120.
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no way of measuring its impact.12 Most of the blame for these shortcomings has been placed on the Foreign Trade Zones Board. It has
failed to ensure that the criteria for zone selection leads to results
likely to be consistent with the legislative intent.
This comment addresses criticisms that the Foreign Trade Zones
Board has inadequately adhered to the legislative intent of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934. Part I examines the legislative history
of the statute to discern a clear statement of its purpose and anticipated effects. It reveals that the universal intent among the drafters of
the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934 was to provide a macro-economic stimulus by expanding the re-export industry. The expected
impact of the legislation was a relocation of re-export operations to
the United States, and a subsequent increase in domestic employment.
The scope of Foreign Trade Zone activity, after legislative and regulatory amendments, evolved into something substantially larger and different than was originally foreseen. The greatest change came when
the Foreign Trade Zones Board created the subzone. The subzone
received all of the benefits of the general purpose zone, but could be
created inside an existing facility. Thus, the subzone eliminated the
need for start-up costs or substantial changes in a company's operation. Opportunities have since realized this facile route to tariff reduction, spawning the rapid growth in Foreign Trade Zone applications
seen today.
Part II examines the actual effects of Foreign Trade Zone activity,
including the benefits that the contemporary zone provides. These
benefits revolve around the lessening of administrative and cash flow
burdens. Ultimately, the benefits increase Foreign Trade Zone user
efficiency, which enhances that user's competitive position in the
market.
Part III summarizes criticisms of Foreign Trade Zones Board policy. These criticisms do not focus on zone benefits, but rather focus on
the manner in which Foreign Trade Zone status is granted. The comment analyzes the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934 s to delineate the
parameters given to the Foreign Trade Zones Board by Congress.
Also, the comment examines whether the Board exceeded these parameters when developing its approval scheme. The inquiry reveals
the language of the statute is broad, requiring only that the Foreign
Trade Zone serve a public benefit.
See infra text accompanying notes 105-115.
13 19 U.S.C. § 81a-81u (1988).
12
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The most common criticisms of the Foreign Trade Zones Board
center on the uncertainty surrounding whether Foreign Trade Zones
provide this public benefit. The drafters intended the public benefit to
manifest itself in the expansion of the re-export business and increased domestic employment. The Foreign Trade Zones Board instead interprets the public benefit criteria less stringently. It requires
that a positive economic benefit be shown, though such a showing is
not statistically possible. Part III concludes that the Foreign Trade
Zones Board appears to be more influenced by pressure from private
actors than by a consideration of what public benefits a Foreign Trade
Zone can provide. Part IV lists Board responses to these criticisms.
Finally, Part V recommends specific actions to remedy the disparity between statutory intent and Foreign Trade Zone practices. It recommends that the application for Foreign Trade Zone status be
confined to municipalities to shield the approval process from private
coercion. It recommends that only local, as opposed to national, businesses be allowed to use the Foreign Trade Zone. It requires a showing that a net positive economic impact (e.g., employment or income
growth) will likely result from a grant of a Foreign Trade Zone status
or approval of a Foreign Trade Zone user. These recommendations
will hopefully depoliticize the approval process, and fulfill the legislative intent that Foreign Trade Zone use serve a public benefit.
I.

TiE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN TRADE ZoNE

The key in determining what role'Foreign Trade Zones should
play in the United States (or American) economy is to examine why
they were established in the first place. This comment does this, and
then follows their statutory evolution. It finds that the clear, dominant theme of Foreign Trade Zone legislation was that it was to enhance the United State's economic vitality.
A. Prior to the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934
The procedures governing the movement of products into United
States customs territory prior to 1934 were inflexible and in many instances inefficient. It was especially burdensome on the re-export
business. To "re-export" means to temporarily move a foreign product into a country for combination with other products and subsequent export. At the time, many ports around the world lacked
adequate facilities for producing or combining products from different
nations. Ports in the United States had the facilities, but were burdened by customs procedures which deterred their use.
609
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The major procedural hurdle at the time was the wasteful "drawback" requirement. "Drawback" was the repayment, in whole or in
part, of a customs duty assessed on goods imported into the United
States and later exported.14 Upon entry into customs territory, after
the duty was paid, the good was taken to the business's location,
manipulated or repackaged, then re-exported. The business would
then apply for repayment of ninety-nine percent of the duty. Because
the application process was so time consuming and confusing, many
re-exporters would abandon their claim."5 In the twelve years prior to
the enactment of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, the amount of
claims for repayment dropped by almost eighty percent. 16 Removal of
the "drawback" requirement, it was thought, would attract re-exporters because it would improve a business's cash flow.
Drawbacks and other customs hurdles, combined with the depression, led to sharp drops in United States foreign trade. Re-exports decreased from over 147 million dollars worth of activity in 1920
to less than 63 million dollars in 1930.1 New York Representative
Cellar, author of the Foreign Trade Zones Act, saw the legislation as a
necessary remedy to the problem of declining re-exports: "...[T]here
is something wrong with our system. I firmly believe that a foreign
trade zone would greatly encourage this reexport business."' The
Foreign Trade Zone Act of 1934 was approved by Congress on May
29, 1934 by a near three-to-one margin. 19
B. The Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934
The Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934 (the Act) established zones
adjacent to or within United States Customs ports of entry which were
considered outside of United States Territory for tariff liability purposes.2 0 Goods within these zones were not subject to formal United
States Customs requirements. 2 '

14 19 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
15 78 CONG. REc. 9853 (1934).

16 Id.at 9854.
17 Id.

18 Id
19 The House vote was 254 for, 95 against, with 80 not voting. Id at 9859-60. There was no

recorded Senate vote. Id at 8477.
20 Pub. L. No. 73-397, 48 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 81a-81u (1988)).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 80-94.
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1. The Foreign Trade Zones Board
The Act created the Foreign Trade Zones Board (the Board) to
oversee the authorization of Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs) to corporate
applicants.' 2 The Board consists of the Secretaries of Commerce, the
Treasury, and the Army.2 3 The Board has the authority to exclude
from the FTZs ". . .any goods or process of treatment that, in its
judgement, is detrimental to the public interest, health, or safety."' 4
2.

The Purpose of The Foreign Trade Zone

FTZs were created to spur economic growth in a country staggered by depression.25 The legislative history indicates that the purpose of the Act was to free United States foreign trade from the
restrictions of customs duties, "not for domestic consumption, but for
re-export to foreign markets and for conditioning
or for combining
'2 6
with domestic products previous to export.

The Act intended to accomplish this objective in three steps.
First, it streamlined United States Customs procedures. Second, after
the procedural impediments were removed, Congress believed that
the United States, because of its modem facilities and strategic location, would become a major transhipment point in the world. 7 This,
Congress hoped, would culminate in the third step: the28promotion of
job growth near United States Customs ports of entry.
United States Customs procedures prior to the Act were not conducive to the re-export of goods. Any entity wishing to re-export
goods through the United States would have to plod through cumbersome customs requirements. It would have to post bond with the Customs Service while the goods remained in United States territory. The
goods were subject to strict surveillance, and their temporary import
involved lengthy and expensive accounting reports. In addition, the
goods had to meet United States health standards, even though they
would never be consumed within United States borders. These and
other customs requirements, it was thought, deterred potential entre22 19 U.S.C. § 81b(a) (1980).
23 Id

24 19 U.S.C. § 810(C) (1980).
25 78 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at 9852-59 (remarks of Representative Cellar).
26 S. REP. No. 905, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
27 78 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at 9852-53. The United States was thought to be ideally
situated between Central and South America, the West Indies, and Canada, on one end and
Europe, Asia and Africa on the other.
28 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 2-3.
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preneurs from establishing transhipment centers within United States
territory 2 9
C. Anticipated Effects of the Act
Drafters of the Act expected many rewards to emerge from its
enactment. Among the anticipated benefits:
1) The encouragement of investment of American capital in new indusFTZs, would engender new "reassembly" or
tries.
(Thebusinesses).
Act, by creating
"mixing"
30
2) The employment of American labor in Foreign Trade Zones which
would replace the work being done by foreigners overseas. (Assembly
and transhipment
businesses overseas would relocate to the United
31
States).
3) The development of American businesses in foreign markets and in
foreign trade (by displaying goods rwithin foreign
32 trade zones, thereby
increasing their exposure to foreign companies).
4) The erection of distribution points in the United States for distribution of foreign merchandise throughout the world.33
5) The enhancement of the American merchant marine. (Increased
transhipment would inevitably lead to greater use, and greater profits,
for the merchant marine). 34
The Act passed with broad support from the legislature as well as
private interests, including trade organizations, the United States
Chamber of Commerce and several port authorities.35 The only opposition to the Act centered on concern that increased foreign competition would hurt domestic business.3 6 It was because of this concern
that both the manufacturing and the full exhibition of products within
FTZs were prohibited.3 7 With this concern addressed, the Act passed
with only a few qualifications, the most noteworthy being the limitation of FTZ grants to corporate use. Preferential treatment was afforded to public corporations. 8
29 78 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at 9853-54.

30 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 1.
31 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 1.
32 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 2.

33 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 3.
34 S. REP. No. 905, supra note 26, at 5.
35 78 CO G. REa, supra note 15, at 9852-53.

36 See GAO Rm,., supra note 4, at 5.
37 GAO Report, supra note 4, at 5.
38 Foreign Trade Zones in the United States, 15 C.F.R. § 400.21(b) (1994).
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D. Actual Effects of the Act
After passage of the Act, FTZs in the United States bore little
consequence on the international trade regime through the 1970's. By
1950, there were only five FTZs in operation.3 9 Many attributed the
dearth of popularity to the prohibitions against manufacturing and exhibition.4° At the same time, foreign trade was rapidly expanding,
and interest in inland ports increased because air commerce had made
it easier to access those ports.41
E. The 1950 Boggs Amendment
Congress passed the Boggs Amendment to the Act in 1950 in response to the complaints of business leaders who believed American
FTZs were neither comparable to, nor competitive with, FTZs of
other countries. 42 Additionally, FTZ operators wished to take advan-

tage of the anticipated boom in the European market as Europe attempted to return to the economic productivity level it maintained
prior to World War IH.4 1 Another reason for drafting the Boggs
Amendment was the ineffectiveness of the provision
allowing "manip44
ulation," but prohibiting "manufacturing."
Examination of the purpose and expected outcome of the proposed legislation clearly delineates the boundaries of FTZ scope and
impact. Subsequent Board regulation resulted in this intention being
disregarded and contravened.
1.

Manufacturing

The inclusion of the manufacturing provision in the Boggs
Amendment was the result of both the FTZ operators' frustration
with their inability to use a business within a zone to its optimal capacity, and the difficulty of defining "manipulation."45 It was argued that
permitting manufacturing within a zone would attract foreign business
39 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 5.
40 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 5.
41 SENATE FIN. Comm., EXPANDiNG Acnv'mEs WrmN FOREIGN TRADE ZONES, S. REP.

No. 1107, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2534 (1949); See also, FTZs: Hearingson H.R. 6159 and H.R.
6160 Before the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1948) (hereinafter Hearings).
42 Hearings, supra note 41, at 10; 93 CONG. REC. A3802 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Cellar).
Foreign Trade Zones of other countries permitted manufacturing and exhibition within their
zones.

43 Hearings,supra note 41, at 12-13.
44 Hearings,supra note 41, at 14-15.
45 94 CoNG. REc. A2919, A2920 (1948) (remarks of Rep. Homer R. Jones).
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interests then operating in other countries' FTZs - the same interests
46
who avoided American FTZs because they lacked that capacity.
The expected increase in business activity would increase domestic
employment levels.
Additionally, operators and regulators encountered difficulty
when attempting to distinguish manipulation, which was permitted
under the Act,47 and manufacturing, which was not.48 This determination was an uncertain, cumbersome, time-consuming process with
great administrative costs.49
2. Exhibition
The addition of exhibition within FTZs was thought to be an opportunity for domestic and foreign businesses to present their goods
to buyers from many countries in a central location.50 Proponents argued that this provision would induce exhibitors showing their5 wares
1
in the FTZs of other countries to relocate to American FTZs.
3. Anticipated Effect. Increased Re-exports and Employment
The drafters of the Amendment explicitly defined how it was to
affect activity within the FTZs, and how that in turn was to affect the
domestic economy. Manufacturing was to be small scale; large manufacturing operations were not envisioned because of the scarcity of
land and high expense of its rental. 52 Some doubted that manufacturing would even be advisable, suggesting, "[Manufacturing] could be
engaged in profitably only if most materials used in the process come
'53
from, and the completed product is sent to foreign nations.
George Bell, the Associate Director of the Office of International
Trade, added, "It is not contemplated that heavy industry or manufacturing activities would be undertaken in these zones.... On the other
hand, many types of light industries would be attracted to the
zones...."54
46 Hearings,supra note 41, at 8.

47
48
49
50

Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-397, 48 Stat. 998, § 3 (1934).
94 CONG. REc., supra note 45, at A2920.
Hearings,supra note 41, at 6.
Hearings,supranote 41, at 7.

51 93 CONG REc., supra note 42.

52 Hearings,supra note 41, at 25.
53 94 CONG. R1c, supra note 45, at A2920.
54 Hearings,supra note 41, at 24. Mr. Bell later added that he could not envision Ford setting up an automobile factory within an FTZ because of the high costs. As of 1983, there were
four automobile plants operating the FTZ subzone status, with four applications from other
automobile manufacturers pending.
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a. Re-exports
There was almost universal agreement among those debating the
Boggs Amendment that its purpose was to enhance American foreign
trade through an increase in re-exports.5 5 New York Representative
Ellsworth B. Buck, co-author of the legislation, said, "The value of
allowing manufacture is attested to by the very considerable manufacturing for export markets normally undertaken in this country with
imported materials. 56 A trade association testified in support of this
view: "Since it seems obvious that practically all manufacturing done
within a zone would be for re-export only, it would seem there is
every reason for this provision and none against it."' 57 Even the National Council of American Importers saw the Amendment as a tool
for increasing re-exports.5 8
The legislative history also reflects an understanding that imports
would increase due to the Boggs Amendment, 59 but only as a supplement to the anticipated export growth. Exhibition in zones would encourage the consumption of those goods coming from overseas and
increase imports.60 Additionally, American producers would be encouraged to purchase more foreign components for combination with
domestic products in FTZs.61 Imports would be beneficial to a certain
extent: they would provide enough foreign companies the dollars to
purchase American goods. 62
b. Employment
Law makers were equally as clear on the impact they expected
the addition of manufacturing and exhibition to have on the economy.
The Boggs Amendment would increase both the number of zones and
the utilization of existing FTZs.63 Increased exports would result in
increased production, which would spur employment.64
55
56
57
58
59

S. REP. No. 1107, supra note 41, at 2534.
Hearings,supra note 41, at 8.
Hearings, supra note 41, at 67 (statement of the Pacific Northwest Trade Association).
Hearings, supranote 41, at 38.
Hearings,supra note 41, at 8.

60 94 CONG. REc., supra note 48.

61 Hearings,supra note 41, at 8.
62 Hearings,supra note 41, at 52.
63 Hearings,supra note 41, at 24 (remarks of George Bell, Associate Director, Office of
International Trade).
64 Hearings,supranote 41, at 8. Co-author Buck added, "It will bring activities and employment ..
.which the country does not now enjoy." Hearings,supra note 41, at 9. The emphasis of
all the congressional testimony was on the creation of new jobs.
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This benefit was not to be limited to local interests. The entire
economy was expected to reap the rewards of FTZ activity. 65 As coauthor Cellar indicated, "There are general provisions in the original
act with reference to control that must be operated in the public interest. The economy of the Nation must be conserved."'
Some say the failure to specifically define this "public interest"
qualification has disabled the Foreign Trade Zones Board from making consistent policy decisions. 67
F. The 1952 Creation of Subzones
Though Congress's last action regarding FTZs came with the passage of the Boggs Amendment, the Foreign Trade Zones Board has
subsequently changed the regulations several times. The most significant and controversial modification came in 1952, when the Board
amended its regulations to authorize special-purpose subzones. 68 The
modification order segregated zones into two categories: General
Purpose Zones and Subzones. The function of each type of zone has
not changed since the 1952 enactment.
1.

The GeneralPurpose Zone

The General Purpose Zone involves the leasing of portions of
zone property by a municipal corporation to multiple private
businesses:
It is an isolated, enclosed and policed area, operated as a public utility,
in or adjacent to a port of entry, furnished with facilities for lading, unlading, handling, storing, manipulating, manufacturing, and exhibiting
goods, and for reshipping them by land, water, or air. Any foreign and
domestic merchandise, except such as is prohibited by law or such as the
Board may order to be excluded as detrimental to the public interest,

health, or safety, may be brought into a zone without being subject to
the customs laws of the United States governing the entry of goods or
the payment of duties therein; and such merchandise permitted in a zone
may be stored, exhibited, manufactured, mixed or manipulated in any

manner, except as provided in the act and other applicable laws or regulations. The merchandise may be exported, destroyed or sent into customs territory from the zone, in the original package or otherwise. It is

65 94 CONG. REc., supra note 45, at A2921.
66 Hearings,supra note 41, at 18.
67 Donald E. deKieffer & George W. Thompson, Politicaland Policy Dimensions of Foreign
Trade Zones: Expansion or the Beginning of the End?, 18 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L 481, 491

(1985).

68 Foreign Trade Zones Board Order No. 29,17 Fed. Reg. 5316 (1952) (codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 400.304 (1988)).

616

Foreign Trade Zones
15:606 (1995)
subject to customs duties 69if sent into customs territory, but not if reshipped to foreign points.

2. Subzones and their Impact
Special-purpose subzones can be established by a single corporation in an existing factory or facility. The subzone "... for one or more

specialized purposes of storing, manipulating, manufacturing or exhibiting goods, may be authorized if the Board finds that existing or authorized zones will not serve adequately the convenience of commerce
with respect to the proposed purposes. '70 The notable distinction between the general purpose zone and the subzone is that subzones can
be applied for directly by an independent corporation. Before the
amendment, zone privileges were granted to municipal corporations,
who would lease areas out to corporations in certain areas. A business using a general purpose zone had to move to the location set
aside by the municipality. With the subzone, however, corporations
may receive zone privileges without having to move, build new facilities or hire new workers.
By the 1980s, subzones had completely changed the nature of
FTZ usage. There were eighteen FTZs (thirteen general purpose
zones and five subzones) in 1973.71 By 1983, there were 117 FTZs
(eighty-seven general purpose zones and thirty subzones). 72 By 1990,
there were over 370 approved FTZs.73
3. The Future of the Foreign Trade Zone
The explosive rate of FTZ growth is unlikely to slow in the next
few years. The Board has recently extended the area of permissible
zone applications from thirty-five miles to sixty miles from the outer
limits of a port of entry,74 which should open the door for even more
applicants.
While the Board has hailed the dramatic increase in FTZ usage as
indicative of increased American economic potential,75 critics have
69 Id.

70 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1985).
71 GAo REP., supra note 4, at 9.
72 GAo REP., supra note 4, at 9.
73 Bus. AM., supra note 5, at 9.
74 15 C.F.RL § 400.21(b)(2)(i)(1993).

75 See, e.g., John J. Da Ponte, Jr., UnitedStates Foreign-TradeZones: Adapting to Tume and
Space, 5 MAi. LAW. 197, 203 (1980). Da Ponte, the Executive Secretary of the Board, stated,
"Multinational firms manufacturing and marketing items of modem technology have a wider
range of choices in the siting of plants and distribution centers. Whereas industries were once
tied to certain locations, mobility and flexibility are now the rule."
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suggested that FTZs may harm the very "public interest" which the
Act's framers intended to promote.76 By 1982, more than ninety percent of all FTZ manufacturing activity took place within subzones.77
Imports, before considered to be only an ancillary benefit which
would offset the trade imbalance brought on by the re-export boom,
make up more than two-thirds of zone activity.78 Additionally, for-

eign-owned corporations have increasingly used American FTZs to
circumvent or diminish import duties, allowing them to price-position
their products more favorably than their American competitors.79
Clearly, then, the use and effect of the FTZ has differed from the
use and effect contemplated by Congress when drafting the FTZ legislation. However, before one may properly analyze whether this use
controverts the congressional intent, an inquiry is needed into the
benefits which accrue to FTZ users. An understanding of the advantages provided by the contemporary FTZ is necessary to an understanding of how it affects the public interest, and thus, to what extent
it fulfills the intent of the Act's authors.
II.

FTZ ADVANTAGES
A. Inverted Tariffs

CONTEMPORARY

The first advantage a FTZ offers is the option of the inverted
tariff. The inverted tariff permits a manufacturer to select the lower
duty rate between the component and finished product. Often, imported components may be assigned higher tariff rates than the finished product. The inverted tariff allows the producer to select the
lower rate.80 Thus, if televisions are prescribed a lower duty than the
plastic frames and electronics parts of which they consist, the manufacturer has the option of choosing the tariff rate on the television.
B. Deferred Duty Payment
The ability to defer duty payment is another benefit to FTZ status. Because the United States Customs Service collects duties only
on products which enter United States Customs territory, the FTZ op76 See, eg., GAO Report, supra note 4; see also, deKieffer & Thompson, supra note 67.
77 United States International Trade Commission Publication 1496, The Implications of Foreign Trade Zones for U.S. Industries and for Competitive Conditions Between U.S. and Foreign
Firms, Report to the Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives, on Investigations Number 332-165 Under Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1332(g)) (Feb. 1984).
78 FTZ Staff, FOREIGN TRADE ZONES INFORMATION SuMMARY, April 20, 1992, at 2.
79 deKieffer & Thompson, supra note 67, at 492-99.

80 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (1991).
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erator has the option of deferring payment until the product leaves
the FTZ for customs territory.8 Importers operating within the FTZ
have the option of classifying its goods as "privileged" or "non-privileged." A product that is classified for duty liability purposes when it
enters the FTZ is "privileged."2 A product which defers duty payment until it leaves the FTZ and enters United States Customs terri'83
tory is "non-privileged.
C. Duty Avoidance
FTZ operators may also take advantage of duty avoidance. The
United States Customs Service only collects duties on products which
enter U.S. Customs territory. Items consumed within the FrZs in the
manufacturing or processing of the emerging product are not required
to pay duties.8n Consider, for example, a television manufacturer
who brings foreign television frames into a FTZ to combine them with
domestic components. It may export the final product without paying
any import duties. Both duty deferral and duty avoidance are attractive to FTZ operators because they improve their flexibility in controlling cash flow. By removing the requirement to pay temporary
duties, FTZ status increases the level of cash on hand for the business.
D. Inventory Control
Another benefit comes by allowing the IFTZ user to make necessary inventory adjustments. A producer may keep foreign merchandise within a FTZ until a purchase order is received. In high turnover
industries, the ability to quickly respond to retailer and end user needs
is a potent competitive advantage. To illustrate, assume demand for
disposable lighters is especially high during the winter. A company
who produces these lighters within a FTZ would be able to store them
at the FTZ and distribute them to retail outlets according to need.
Not only could the company improve cash flow by being able to select
when to import the lighter, but it could also serve as a convenient,
central location from which to distribute.

81 Id.
82 19 C.F.R.

§ 14621 (1985).

83 19 C.F.R. § 14623 (1985).
84 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (1991).
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E. Exhibition Advantages
As mentioned earlier, an importer can exhibit its product within a
FTZ.85 This is done prior to the product's entrance into U.S. customs
territory, thereby precluding import duties. Exhibition is attractive to
prospective buyers, and can increase the number of buyers without
increasing administrative or monetary barriers.
F. Local Tax Relief
Aside from national tariff relief, FTZ users can operate free from
local ad valorem taxes.86 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 exempts
all foreign and domestically produced merchandise that enters a FTZ
from all state and local ad valorem taxes. 87 This is a significant symbolic exemption. First, it removes the FTZ from local control and
accountability. Second, it moves the FTZ towards national accountability. As will be discussed later, this goes against the original congressional intent that the FrZs have only a local effect.
G. Quota Leveraging
FTZ users who import may use the FTZs to leverage against temporary or permanent quotas set up by the United States. Because the
FTZs are technically outside of United States Customs territory, such
restrictions could not apply to products within the FTZ boundaries. 88
Thus, a prohibition against importing more than 10,000 items of Product X would not apply to the FTZ user. The FTZ user could stockpile
as much of Product X as it needed, reaping those rewards which might
accompany the accumulation. For example, the FTZ user could immediately flood the market with Product X once the quota was lifted.
H. Security Standards
FTZs offer another advantage to businesses because they require
a high standard of security.8 9 FrZs must be within fenced off areas
and require close supervision. Since the operator must pay for zone
85 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c)(1991).

86 For a more complete treatment of this advantage, see Kenneth M. Horwitz & J. William
McArthur, Jr., Recent Developments Favor Use of Foreign Trade Zones as a Way to Avoid Local
Taxes, 63 J.TAx'N 172 (1985).
87 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 925 (1988)).
88 15 C.F.R., § 400.1(c)(1991).
89 19 C.F.R. § 146 (1993).
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use, she is essentially purchasing part of the added security, which is
still attractive because it reduces the cost of insurance.
I. Administrative Relief
Re-exporters also benefit from the existence of FTZs. They are
spared the administrative burdens of bringing products into United
States Customs territory. They do not have to pay ordinary customs
fees nor post an importer's bond. Importer's bonds are instruments
which insure that the importer will comply with import regulations.
The fee is at least $100, 90 and must be supported by a great deal of
paperwork.91 Removal of this requirement makes the FTZ user more
efficient.
J. Non-Most Favored Nation Products Characterization
Another advantage lay in the treatment of Non-Most Favored
Nation Product imports. Components imported from countries which
lack Most Favored Nation status (and thus, whose goods are subject to
a higher tariff rate) may be charged a lower tariff rate through the
inverted tariff if the foreign product emerging from the FTZ has a
different name, character and use than it had when it entered the
FTZ.92 This enhances the FTZ user's price position in the market.
K. Country of Origin Marking Requirements
Another advantage to FTZ status is that goods passing through a
FTZ for re-export are not subject to United States Country of Origin
marking requirements. 93 Imported items must be marked with the
name of the ultimate purchaser in the United States, and the name of
the country of origin. Additional procedures apply for containerized
goods.94 FTZ status removes these administrative hassles.
L. Ancillary Benefits
Other benefits spring from those already mentioned. Importers
may inspect products for defects at the FTZ before sending them
through customs, thus saving the cost of reshipping them to the port
90 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(a) (1993).
91 19 C.F.R. § 113.62 (1993).
92 Customs Service Decision 79-41 Foreign Trade Zones: Dutiability of ChemicalsManufactured From Components Imported From Communist Country, 13 CUSTOMS BuLL. 1056, 1057
(1978).
93 19 C.F.R. § 134 (1985).
94 19 C.F.R. § 134.11 (1993).
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after the wholesaler/retailer rejects them. Additionally, the advantages of not having to strictly account for products being held or
stored in FTZs alleviates the administrative burden that the same
products would bear if they were in United States Customs territory.
The elimination of financial and administrative barriers is an advantage which runs through all of these benefits. Notably, these advantages serve the importer much more than the exporter. Critics of
the Board and FTZ regulations have focused on this trend while making the argument that contemporary FTZs defy their original purpose
which is to serve the public interest by stimulating the re-export
business.
III.

CRITICISMS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE ZoNE

A. How Foreign Trade Zone Status is Granted
The explosive growth of FTZ usage is understandable, given the
many advantages of operating within a FTZ. Yet, most criticisms of
the FTZs do not center on the benefits which accrue to FTZ users.
Rather, the critiques focus on the Board's method of determining
when one may receive these benefits. It is clear that Congress created
FTZs to stimulate the domestic economy.95 However, instead of basing FTZ approval on the expected economic impact a business might
have, the Board has clouded the criteria by basing approval on the
vague notion of "public benefit." The result has been an approval
process which seems much more directed by political pressure from
private actors than by an independent consideration of what economically benefits the public. Congress created FTZs to stimulate the domestic transhipment and re-export industries, yet imports now
dominate zone activity. To fully appreciate these criticisms, it is necessary to examine how FTZ status is gained. An analysis of the application process is in order.
The Board has the authority to approve FTZs and their users.9 6
The language giving the Board this authority is broad, limiting approval only to "the conditions and restrictions of this chapter and the
rules and regulations made thereunder." 97 Since the Board is responsible for writing these rules and regulations, 98 it creates its own limitations. The few Congressionally mandated restrictions are not very
95 See supra text accompanying notes 25-38.

96 19 U.S.C. § 81b(a) (1993).
97 Id.

98 19 U.S.C. § 81(i) (1993).
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descriptive. Preference is to be given to public corporations.99 Applications are to be denied where there is a state-municipality conflict of
ownership.' °° There is little else in the statute which governs how
FTZs are to be approved. The Board's power appears to be unchecked. Not only does it determine how FTZs are to be granted, but
it regulates their operation as well. The only check is through external
judicial proceedings, and courts have been extremely deferential when
reviewing the scope of Board authority (because of the broadly writ101
ten statute).
The Board has promulgated its method of evaluating FTZ applications in 15 C.F.R. § 400.23 (1993). The Board centers its approval
on the public interest criterion. The authorization of the FTZ must be
consistent with public policy, United States Trade and Tariff law, must
not interfere with trade negotiations and must not be the sole cause of
imports into the United States.'02 If these threshold matters are satisfied, then the Board must "consider" the following factors when determining a public benefit:
(i) Overall employment impact;
(ii) Exports and re-exports;
(iii) Retention, creation of manufacturing activity.
(iv) Extent of value-added activity;
(v) Overall effect on import levels;
(vi) Extent of foreign competition;
(vii) Impact on domestic industry; and
(viii) Other relevant information relating to the public interest. 0 3
These factors, manipulable because they are not quantified, must be
"tak[en] into account" when determining if an FTZ grant would result
in a significant public benefit. The applicant bears the "burden" of
proving that, given these criteria, such a benefit would result.0 4
These are the guidelines the Board is given when granting FTZ status,
and the genesis of the sharp criticism it has encountered.
This broad issue of whether the public interest is being served by
contemporary FTZs has been focused through three specific categories of questions:
99 19 U.S.C. § 81b(c) (1993).

100 19 U.S.C. § 81b(d) (1993).
101 See ag., Armco Steel Corporationv. Stans, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970); Nissan Manufacturing Corp v. United States, 693 F.Supp 1183 (CL Int'l Trade 1988); HawaiianIndependent Refinery
v. United States, 460 F.Supp. 1249 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
102 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(b)(1) (1993).
103 15 C.F.R. § 400.23 (1993).
104 Id.
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(1) Whether FTZs have a positive effect on domestic
employment;
(2) Whether FTZ usage provides selective competitive advantages to fortunate grantees; and
(3) Whether the Board criteria for granting FTZs is too broad to
effectively carry out the statutory guidelines set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 81
(1993).
B. Employment Effects of the FTZ
The Framers of the Act and the Amendment clearly intended
that zones have a positive effect on domestic employment. 10 5 The employment issue can be encapsulated in two questions; First, has FTZ
use created more jobs; and second, if not, what is the likelihood that it
has diminished domestic employment levels.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the employment impact of FTZs at the request of Dan Rostankowski, the Chair10 6
man of the House of Representatives Ways & Means Committee.
The request was spurred by concern that FTZ growth was excessive,
and that too much of FTZ activity centered on imports. 0 7 The GAO
undertook two levels of analysis: local and national economic impact.10 8 The GAO concluded that locally, FTZs had a varied effect on
employment levels, and that it was too difficult to draw any definitive
conclusions. 10 9 The report described one scenario where a car manufacturer which imported foreign components into a FTZ warned that
if FTZ status were not available, it could not take advantage of the
inverted tariff, and would be financially better off by importing the
entire automobile. 110 The implication was that FTZ status was a contributing factor in the company's decision to continue manufacturing
in the United States. Thus, the F-Z in this instance assisted in maintaining the local employment level."' Another example cited revealed an increase in employment when foreign car manufacturers set
up assembly plants within FTZs. They attributed their decision to
come to the United States and manufacture to favorable market conditions, among them the advantages of FTZ status. It was unclear that
105 See supra notes 20-30.
106 Letter from Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways & Means, House of Representatives, to William . Anderson, Director, Government Accounting Office (May 20, 1983).
107 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 9. By 1982, imports made up 80% of all FTZ activity.
108 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 24.
109 See GAO REP., supra note 4, at 24-28.
110 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 25.
111 GAO REP.,

supra note 4, at 25.
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but for FTZ status, the manufacturers would not have initiated operations in the United States.112 This does not necessarily lead one to the
conclusion that FTZs lead to greater employment levels.
One peculiar phenomenon in local FTZ impact was job relocation. Existing businesses could move their operations into a general
purpose zone and receive the benefits of FTZ status without increasing the number of workers they employed. 113 Other firms could receive subzone status without moving, without hiring new employees,
and, thus, without materially affecting local employment levels. While
there may be an increase in the firm's sales (due to more competitive
price positioning), any public benefit would probably be nominal. It is
unclear, therefore, that FTZs, especially subzones, contribute in any
way to local employment growth.
The GAO analysis was also inconclusive on whether FTZs provided any positive effect on national employment levels. The report
stated, "... [W]hen addressing national employment effects, consideration must be given to the effect that any zone-induced activities have
on international capital flows, the balance of payments, and the ex'
change rate of the dollar for other currencies."114
In other words, the
inflow of foreign capital will cause the dollar to appreciate against foreign currencies, which will lead to increased consumption of foreign
goods and, subsequently, the loss of American firms' markets.
Since it is unclear that FTZs promote job growth, the next question is whether they reduce domestic employment. One scenario suggests that they may. If a domestic producer who makes automobiles
wholly out of domestic parts can obtain subzone status, she may be
inclined to purchase less expensive foreign parts as a substitute. The
inverted tariff rate will make this possible. Thus, domestic components would no longer be consumed, thereby reducing domestic component consumption, and ultimately reducing domestic employment
levels. One familiar with FTZ application procedures may argue that
this scenario would not manifest because a subzone applicant must
demonstrate that the proposed FTZ would be in the public interest.
In reality, this argument fails. The public interest requirement is so illdefined that it can easily be overcome. 115 Thus, it is quite possible
that a FTZ which has a negative economic effect on domestic employment could receive Board approval.
112 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 25.
113 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 24.
114 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 26.

115 See infra text accompanying notes 135-141.
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It is clear then that FTZs might not only have a nominal positive
impact, but may have a perversely negative impact on domestic employment levels. The GAO's examination of the employment impact
of FTZs revealed too many variables to confirm the existence of
either benefits or harms. It follows that any claim that a particular
FTZ approval will result in a positive economic outcome is not statistically provable. If the Board took seriously the requirement that an
applicant must prove that FTZ status will lead to a positive economic
benefit, no FTZ would ever be granted. However, since FTZ status is
granted, this suggests the Board does not take the positive economic
requirement seriously.
C.

FTZs As Selectively Unfair Competitive Advantages

A number of American industrial representatives have alleged
that FTZs provide no material benefit to the public, but are merely
advantageous to the user. The debates surrounding the Boggs
Amendment acknowledged that there is an underlying unfairness to
granting FTZ status to one company but not another. "If it is felt that
there would be an undue advantage to a manufacturer there as against
all the other manufacturers, they may seek to exclude them and not
give them the privilege... "116 One of the only opponents of the
Boggs Amendment was a collective of oriental rug importers, who
foresaw the dumping of rugs into FTZs on consignment, whereas existing dealers had fixed investments in purchasing operations overseas.1 17 Recently, the domestic steel, electronic components, textile
and bicycle industries have objected to FTZ use. 118 The electronic
component producers charged that FTZs "provide special privileges
which, when combined with the inverted tariff, enable certain companies to gain an unfair competitive advantage over their counterparts
who are not located in foreign trade zones."1 1 9
Claims of unfairness can rest on the fact that not
all businesses
are eligible for FTZ status. General purpose zones are granted only
to those communities within sixty miles of the port of entry. 120 Communities and businesses outside of this perimeter are immediately disqualified. Subzones are not limited to this area restriction. However,
the discretionary authority of the Board to approve and deny sub116

Hearings,supra note 41, at 63.

117 Hearings,supra note 41, at 68.
118 GAO RE'.,

supra note 4, at 20.

119 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 21.
120 15 C.F.R. § 400.21(b)(2)(i) (1991).

626

Foreign Trade Zones
15:606 (1995)

zones is so broad, and the criteria for zone approval so nebulous, that
political and other pressures unrelated to the public interest could
bring about one subzone's approval or denial. Thus, FTZs could be
awarded, not to the business which would best serve the public interest, but to the business which has the most competent political
operators.
D. FTZ Approval Criteria Too Broad, Board
Discretion Too Great
19 U.S.C. § 81b(a) (1993) gives the Board authority, subject to
the conditions and restrictions within the statute, to grant corporations zones in or adjacent to United States ports of entry. Each port
of entry is entitled to at least one zone; additional zones are authorized only if existing zones will not adequately serve the convenience of
commerce. 2 ' Preference is to be given to public corporations."2 The
statute also requires the applicant, when considering a FTZ application, to provide "such other information as the Board may require."' 2
The "public interest" criteria, which the Board so heavily relies
upon, was initially intended to govern the re-entry of domestic products from a FTZ back into United States Customs territory. "Such
articles may not be returned to customs territory for domestic consumption except when the Foreign Trade Zones Board deems such
return to be in the public interest." 24 Additionally, the Board "may
at any time order the exclusion from the zone of any goods or process
of treatment that in its judgement is detrimental to the public interest,
health, or safety."' 5
The plain language and legislative history of the statute clearly
manifest the authors' desire that a return of domestic merchandise
into United States Customs territory from a FTZ be an exception, 26
and should only be permitted if it is in the public interest. The regulations developed by the Board, however, hinge approval of the entire
FTZ upon this requirement. 27 The public interest requirement lacks
121 19 U.S.C. § s1f(a)(5) (1980).
122 19 U.S.C. § 81b(c) (1980).

123 19 U.S.C. § 81f(a)(5) (1993).
124 19 U.S.C. § 81(c) (1980).

125 19 U.S.C. § 81o(c) (1980).
126 See supra notes 21-23.

127 15 C.F.R. § 400.31 (1991). The Board virtually ignores the emphasis in § 81c that the
import of domestic material from a FTZ was intended to be an exceptional circumstance, and
that an affirmative showing that the activity was in the public interest was required before reimport was allowed. Instead, it relies on § 81o(c), which addresses what the Board may prohibit
items detrimental to the public interest. It then makes the logical leap to infer that imports
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the specificity to hold the Board to any consistent line of policy making. The Board has an enormous amount of discretion when deciding
whether to grant an applicant zone status.
IV. BOARD RESPONSES
While the Board has not attempted to directly answer the criticisms that FTZ activity may not help (and may even hurt) domestic
employment and that FTZs offer unfair competitive advantages, it has
extensively defended its adherence to the public interest criteria when
evaluating FTZ applications.1 8 The Board has responded to the
charge that it has too much discretion by pointing out that it has not
violated the power vested in it by the statute. 29 The courts have supported this position. In Armco Steel Corporationv. Stans,' 30 a domestic steel producer challenged the Board's authority to grant a subzone
where, among other things, "heavy" manufacturing was to take place.
The Court rejected this contention, stating that the Foreign Trade
Zones Act gave the Board "wide discretion to determine what activity
may be pursued by trade zone manufacturers subject only to the legislative standard that a zone serve this country's interests in foreign
trade.. .,"31 This ruling was backed up by other court decisions which
32

established a deferential judicial posture towards Board decisions.'
The Board has used this "wide discretion" response as a blanket
defense to criticisms regarding subzones. The charge that subzones
serve an interest contrary to the public interest has been met with the
response that although subzones are not structured to serve the public, their activity may have a public effect, and the Board has the
broad discretion to determine whether that effect is in the public interest. 33 In other words, the FTZ is in the public interest because the
Board says it is. The Board provides a final justification for its policies by stating that it has produced criteria sufficient for a determination of whether a proposed subzone or general purpose zone is within
the public interest. This comment, like many others that have ex(including re-imports) are automatically allowed entry "unless detrimental to the public
interest."
128 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES iN THE UNrTED STATES, 56 Fed. Reg. 50790-98 (1991).
129 Id. at 50793.

130
131
132
133

431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 785.
693 F.Supp 1183 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Hawaiian Independent Refinery, supra note 101.
Foreign Trade Zones Board Order No. 530, 56 Fed. Reg. 50793 (1991).
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amined the statute,'3 does not contest that the language of the statute
gives the Board such discretion. Rather, it seeks to remedy the incongruency between legislative intent and practice by tightening the statutory language.
This comment approaches this remedy by first responding to each
of the Board's defenses to these criticisms. Finally, it will examine the
language of 19 U.S.C. § 81 and suggest an alternative way to meet the
legislative intent of the Act.
V.

CONCLUSION:

CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATION

A. Board Defenses: Analysis and Response
1. Economic Benefit Undeterminable
The Board's claim that it can determine from the given standards
whether an applicant for a FTZ will operate in the public interest
overstates its capabilities. A significant factor in determining whether
there is an public benefit is the positive employment impact a FTZ's
operation would have.135 Yet it has already been established that it is
not possible to accurately assess the impact a FTZ has on either local
or national employment levels.' 6 The criteria for determining positive economic impact have no quantifiable amount attached to them.
Thus, a Board motivated by political or private pressure could easily
find a potential positive economic impact if it wanted to.
2. Limited Opportunityfor Opposition in Approval Process
The application and approval process seems susceptible to onesided pressure. Once the applicant has filed the necessary paperwork,
the Board publishes a notice in the Federal Register. 137 Those wishing
to contest a grant of zone status have sixty days within which to do
so. 138 Only applicants for general purpose zones must hold public
hearings in the community where the zones are being proposed; subzone applicants are not required to do so. 139 Thus, national competi134 See, eg., John J. Da Ponte, Jr., United States Foreign Trade Zones: Adapting to Time and
Space, 5 MAIrznmE LAW. 197, 214 (1980) ("even absent such language, the legislative history
suggests [that broad discretionary] authority is implicit"); Susan M. Spraul, Note, Nissan Motor
ManufacturingCorp. v. United States: An Update in Foreign Trade Zone Law, 14 N.C. J. INT'L
L & COM. Reg. 483 (1989).
135 See infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 101-110.
137 15 C.F.R. § 400.27(c)(2) (1993).

138 15 C.F.R. § 400.27(c)(2) (1993).
139 Telephone Interview, Camille Evans, Program Assistant, Foreign Trade Zones staff (May
25,1995).
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tors of local businesses seeking FTZ status, unless they regularly
perused the Federal Register, would be entirely unaware that their
competitor is seeking zone status and its advantages, and would be
unable to contest the application. Furthermore, local opposition
seems unlikely, since only a direct competitor would be hurt by the
advantages FTZ status provides. Absent the protest of competitors,
the only inertia in the decision of whether to approve or reject a FTZ
would come from the private actor, who could, had he the resources,
exert considerable political pressure on the Board to approve. This
leaves the Board as the only real obstacle to a grant of zone status,
and magnifies the import of those criteria-the Board relies upon to
approve zone status.
It appears, though, that these criteria are deficient. The GAO
report lamented the lack of distinguishing criteria for FTZ approval:
"Theoretically, almost every domestic business could qualify for zone
status and thereby obtain the duty benefits on the goods they import."'14 0 This flies in the face of Representative Cellar's remarks
before the Amendment was passed: "You could not have unlimited
zones, widespread all over the country."' 41
3. Other Problems
The Board has offered no defense to the charge that FTZs provide unfair competitive advantages to those fortunate enough to obtain them. Nor has the Board responded to the allegation that it has
too much authority, except to say that it has been granted that authority in the statute. This, however, misses the point. If the level of discretion afforded to the Board up to this point has led to a deluge of
foreign components in the United States market, decreased American
employment levels and unfair competitive advantages to select manufacturers, then there is something wrong with their decision-making
process.
B. Recommendations to Make the Language of 19 U.S.C. § 81
(1993) Reflect the Legislative Intent
The Foreign Trade Zones Statute, 19 U.S.C. § 81a-u (1993),
should be amended to more specifically reflect the intent of the drafting legislature. That is, the FTZ should increase domestic employment levels and encourage foreign trade. The following modifications
140 GAO REP., supra note 4, at 23.

141 Hearings,supranote 41, at 16.
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are designed to restore the integrity of the FTZ system in two ways.
First, they remove those components of Board discretion which can be
tainted by pressure from private actors. Section 81b(a) takes the responsibility for promoting the zone away from private users and gives
it to the municipality. Second, they increase the likelihood that a FTZ
grant will result in economic growth. Proposed sections 81b(b) and
81f articulate a clearer standard for showing a FTZ will have a positive aggregate economic effect.
These changes are not all inclusive. There are several minor linguistic changes that will need to be made to the statute to reflect the
broad, substantive modifications here specified. The changes will be
highlighted in bold type.
SECTION: 19 U.S.C. § 81b(a)
SUBJECT: Board Authorization to Grant Zones
CURRENT LANGUAGE: The Board is authorized, subject to
conditions and restrictions of this chapter... to grant to corporations
the privilege of establishing, operating, and maintaining Foreign Trade
Zones....
MODIFICATION: The Board is authorized, subject to conditions and restrictions of this chapter... to grant to municipalities the
privilege of establishing, operating, and maintaining Foreign Trade
Zones.... Municipalities will seek approval for each corporation, or
other business entity, who wishes to operate within the zone. The
Board will approve zone operation on a case by case basis, subject to
the criteria specified in this chapter.
COMMENT: The amendment removes the private company
from a petition for FTZ status. This will decrease the politicization of
the FTZ approval process, for municipalities are much more likely
than the particular corporation to prudently weigh whether a corporation is serving a public benefit. Moreover, a municipality will be less
likely to expend huge resources campaigning for particular operator
approval. This precludes the powerful corporation from directly lobbying the Board. While the powerful corporation could still lobby the
municipality, it would not have direct access to the Board, as it now
does. Nor could powerful corporations directly lobby the Board to
quash the applications of competitors, as they may do now. This
shield should lead to greater Board objectivity, and will likely make its
decision more reflective of the public economic interest.
SECTION: 19 U.S.C. § 81b(b)
SUBJECT: Number of Zones per Port of Entry
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CURRENT LANGUAGE: Each port of entry shall be entitled
to at least one zone.... Zones in addition to those which a port of
entry is entitled shall be authorized only if the Board finds that existing or authorized zones will not adequately serve the convenience
of commerce.
MODIFICATION: Each port of entry shall be entitled to at least
one zone.... Zones in addition to those which a port of entry is entitled shall be authorized only if the Board finds a substantial likelihood
that an additional zone would lead to a net increase in regional economic activity, as defined by increased employment levels or income.
COMMENT: The "convenience of commerce" standard for determining the necessity of an additional FTZ does not comport with
the intent that FTZs serve a public benefit. FTZs are inherently convenient because they remove procedural and financial barriers. The
"substantial likelihood of net economic activity increase" reflects the
legislative intent, yet allows the Board some degree of flexibility. It is
the standard which will be used throughout the remainder of the
amended statute.
SECTION: 19 U.S.C. § 81f
SUBJECT: Application for Establishment of Zone; Expansion
of Zone
CURRENT LANGUAGE:
(a) Each application shall state in detail(1) The location and qualifications of the area in which is
proposed to establish a zone, showing [physical compatibility for zone
use and expansion];
(2) the facilities and appurtenances which it is proposed to
provide and the preliminary plans and estimate of the cost thereof,
and the existing facilities and appurtenances which it is proposed to
utilize;
(3) the time within which the applicant proposes to commence and complete the construction of the zone and facilities and
appurtenances;
(4) the methods proposed to finance the undertaking;
(5) other such information as the Board may require.
(b) The Board may upon its own initiative or upon request permit the amendment of the application. Any expansion of the area of
an established zone shall be made and approved in the same manner
as an original application.
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MODIFICATION:
Title: Application for establishment of a zone; Criteria for approval of zone users.
a) Each zone application shall state in detail[19 U.S.C. § 81f(a)(1-4) will remain the same.]
(5) the anticipated use of the zone, including a list of pending or potential users;
(6) Such other information as the Board may require.
b) Each user application will contain the following:
(1) A showing by each applicant that;
(i) the business activity is physically suitable for this
particular zone;
(i) the business activity will particularly benefit from
zone status;
(iii) the business activity is an intra-state entity, with no
subsidiary or branch offices outside the state;
(iv) the business activity shows a substantial likelihood
that its use of the zone would lead to a net increase
in regional economic activity, as defined by increased employment levels or income.
(2) a showing by the business entity that it has the financial
resources to operate within a zone.
(3) a statement by the municipality that the business activity's use of the zone will not give the business activity a competitive
advantage unavailable to a competitor in the same geographic and
product markets.
(4) such other information as the Board may require.
COMMENT: The amendment breaks up the application process
into two steps. The municipality must first apply for the FTZ. Then,
the municipality must submit applications for each user.
Section (1)(i) is self-explanatory.
Section (1)(ii) is intended to preclude zone use from business activities who will only realize marginal benefits from zone status. For
example, a business whose product is composed of 5% foreign components and who only exports 2% of its product would not be as likely to
benefit from FTZ use as the business which has 50% foreign components and exports 40% of its product.
Section (1)(iii) is intended to limit the size of the FTZ user. This
is responsive to the criticism that certain national manufacturers gain
unfair price advantages over other national manufacturers through
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FTZ use. By limiting FTZ users to intra-state operators, the adverse
impact on those businesses outside of FTZ range is lessened. This
would prevent a firm's location from turning into an artificial competitive advantage. This is simply a suggestion. There may be alternative
means of limiting the size of the FTZ which more directly address the
problem of unfair competition.
Section (1)(iv) is intended to give the Board a more definitive
guideline when determining the central issue of FTZ user approvalwhether a public benefit will result. As discussed earlier, the one consensually agreed upon public benefit was the increase in domestic employment. The question the Board would ask here is: "How many
new jobs will this business create by using a FTZ?" or "How much net
income growth will result from this business' use of the FTZ?" Without showing that there is a substantial likelihood that these results will
occur, the application will fail. This is an improvement over existing
criteria because each business activity is responsible for making this
showing. Thus, the evidence is much more verifiable than is an analysis of aggregate employment activity. A mere shift in business activity
from one site to another would be an insufficient showing under this
criterion.
Finally, Section (3), requiring a statement by the sponsoring municipality that the opportunity for FTZ status is equally available, is
designed to preclude one local business from gaining an unfair competitive advantage over another business. The municipality operating
the FTZ must provide equal access to its facilities.
C. Expected Impact of Proposed Amendments
These amendments should remedy the approval process and use
of FTZs in three ways. First, the approval process will be insulated
from direct lobbying by private, powerful corporations. Currently, an
application for FTZ status is susceptible to public challenge. A small
manufacturer who competes in the same product market as a national
competitor could be overwhelmed by the competitor's challenge to its
FTZ application. It would likely be unable to match the resources and
political clout of its powerful challenger. Because the standards for
approval are easy to manipulate, if the Board has been heavily pressured by the powerful lobby it could easily claim an alternative reason
for denying the application. Under the amendments, municipalities
would bear the brunt of such lobbying efforts, but would still be responsible for producing hard data to the Board to meet the new
criteria.
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Second, the amendments should eliminate the negative effects of
the subzone while retaining the positive ones. No longer will businesses be able to apply for zones. However, a showing of a positive
economic benefit, as measured by net or income growth, would allow
a city to establish a subzone. Thus, the advantages that the geographic
flexibility of the subzones provided could still be had.
Finally, the amendments would restore the credibility of Board
decisions by forcing the Board to comply with relatively clear standards. The removal of direct political pressure on the Board, and the
requirement of an affirmative showing of a public economic benefit
will serve notice to all future applicants that decisions are made with
some level of objectivity. These amendments would restore this confidence in the Board by tying the Board to the broad objectives that the
drafters of the Act intended.
D. Final Considerations
Finally, the concept of the foreign trade zone should be reconsidered. In a world economy with significant trade barriers (e.g., tariffs
and administrative burdens), the advantages of a FTZ are significant
and attractive. However, in our emerging world economy, where
trade barriers are being lowered or removed, the FTZ begins to lose
its appeal. Inverted tariffs will lose their significance when all duties
are near the same level. In addition, the nominal cost savings of duty
deferral in a country with low tariff rates would be unimportant to the
importer, who would likely consider application and payment for a
FTZ to be an unnecessary administrative hassle. Legislators should
consider the necessity of such an instrument in a trade environment
that appears to be outgrowing it. To retain any protectionist device
will undoubtedly benefit the few fortunate enough to qualify for it.
Yet ultimately, the consequences of such protectionism fall squarely
on the shoulders of the domestic consumer.

